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Abstract
This paper examines optimal exchange policy when nominal interest
rates are unusually low, as experienced by several Asian economies and
Japan since July 2006. The paper nds that in such environments, it
is optimal to create a nominal depreciation to o¤set contractionary dis-
turbances. However, the limited scope of monetary policy easing may
compromise the ability of the central bank to create a nominal depreci-
ation especially if the central bank makes decisions on monetary policy
making on a discretionary basis. In order to successfully create a nominal
depreciation, the central bank needs to rely on the expectations channel,
by making a credible promise to keep its currency weak going forward.
Finally, trade liberalization, by enhancing the role of the exchange rate
channel on the transmission mechanism, may allow the central bank to
achieve lower average ination.
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1 Introduction
The recent experience of low interest rates in many countries has led to consid-
erable interest in the design of monetary policy in the presence of a zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates. Such a low interest rate environment presents
a particular problem for monetary policy since the e¤ectiveness of short-term
nominal interest rates, a main instrument for most central banks, could be lim-
ited by the zero lower bound. Particularly, the central bank will not be able to
o¤set severe contractionary disturbances by lowering the nominal interest rate
by the desired amount. Thus, the central bank will not be able to stimulate
the economy via the standard interest-rate channel.
Academics and policymakers alike have made proposals regarding the con-
duct of monetary policy in the presence of such a constraint. One interesting
approach that has been widely studied is for the central bank to resort to the
exchange rate channel and use exchange rates as a policy instrument, if the
interest-rate channel becomes ine¤ective due to the zero lower bound. Promi-
nent studies based on this approach include Orphanides and Wieland (2000),
Svensson (2001), McCallum (2002) and Coenen and Wieland (2003, 2004). In
a broader context, this is also related to a growing literature in which many
authors have emphasized the importance of exchange rates as a distinct policy
instrument in managing aggregate demand.1
This is indeed the strategy pursued by many real-world central banks, the
most interesting of which are those in the Far East. Having experienced one of
the lowest short-term nominal interests since 2000, several Asian central banks
have actively pursued several measures to inuence their exchange rates.2 Even
so, it appears that these central banks, especially those under oating exchange
rates, have failed to achieve exchange rates that are deemed to be appropriate
for their economic conditions. This raises a question whether such exchange
rate policy is desirable, especially if the attempt to achieve the target exchange
rates leads to a conict with other policy objectives. And in the case that such
policy is indeed desirable, what is the implementation strategy that will allow
central banks to achieve their target exchange rates?
This paper sets forth a framework to study optimal exchange rate policy
when the nominal interest rate is low and is likely to be constrained by the zero
lower bound. In particular, the paper characterizes the path of the nominal
exchange rate that is consistent with the commitment equilibrium, an optimal
allocation that can be implemented by ination targeting (Svensson and Wood-
ford, 2005).
This paper di¤ers from the earlier literature in some important aspects.
First of all, due to computational di¢ culties in solving a fully dynamic model
with an explicit bound, which is essentially a nonlinear setup, the earlier lit-
erature has made certain assumptions that are unusual for modern dynamic
1See for example Taylor (2001), Edwards and Yeyati (2005) and Edwards (2006).
2Section 7 discusses the recent experience of a few Asian central banks that attempted to
manipulatetheir exchange rates.
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stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, in order to simplify the compu-
tation. These include working on a simplied setup that is not fully dynamic
or assuming away the standard conditions of uncertainty and rational expecta-
tions.3 This setup appears to be useful in studying how the central bank should
respond when the nominal interest rate has already been constrained at zero for
some time, the scenario that is applicable to the economic experience of Japan
prior to 2006.
This paper, on the other hand, relies on a microfounded open-economy
DSGE model, with the standard conditions of uncertainty and rational expec-
tations. Using this setup allows us to study monetary policy strategy in which
the nominal interest rate is low, but strictly above zero, and there is a possibility
that the nominal interest rate might fall to zero, if the economy is hit by severe
contractionary shocks. This is the scenario that is currently relevant to Japan
and several Asian countries.
Furthermore, in contrast to earlier papers, most of which rely on Taylor-
type monetary policy rules, this paper studies optimal monetary policyin the
sense that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate to strike an optimal
balance between the costs of variability in ination and the costs of variability
in the output gap.
Thus, this paper is closely related to Adam and Billi (2006, 2007) who study
optimal monetary policy in the presence of the zero lower bound but in a closed-
economy model. It should be noted that extending the analysis of Adam and
Billi into the open-economy setting is not straightforward. For one thing,
with the standard assumptions of uncertainty and rational expectations, there
exists no closed-form solution to the problem of optimal monetary policy under
nonlinear models. To solve such problems, one has to resort to numerical
analysis, and specically in this case, the collocation method.
Like most algorithms in numerical analysis, a drawback of the collocation
method is that the method may not work when applied to a model larger than
the canonical closed-economy DSGE model. This is known as the curse of
dimensionality, a situation in which numerical-analysis algorithms fail when
applied to a large system of equations. As a contribution to the literature, this
paper presents a strategy to avoid the curse of dimensionality when applying
the collocation method to multi-sector models, such as an open-economy DSGE
model.
This paper derives three main results. First, when interest rates are low, it
is optimal for the central bank to engineer a nominal depreciation of its currency
in response to a contractionary shock.
3For example, McCallum (2002) does not explicitly recognize the zero lower bound, but
starts from the scenario in which the nominal interest rate has been constrained at zero.
Therefore, the nominal interest rate is xed at zero and the uncovered interest parity is
dropped from the model. Svensson (2004) does not rely on the New Keynesian Phillip curve
but instead assumes that rms set prices one period in advance and solve a three-period model
in which the natural interest rate turns negative during period 2. Coenen and Wieland (2003)
work on a fully dynamic model, but assume that certainty equivalence counterfactually holds.
This implies that private agents form expectations on the future paths of the economy as if
the zero lower bound did not exist.
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Second, in the context of oating exchange rates, which become prevalent
in both industrialized and emerging-market countries, the central bank cannot
control exchange rates perfectly. Therefore the central bank may not necessarily
be able to achieve a nominal depreciation at will. However, this paper nds
that adopting commitment-based policy, by making a credible promise that
constrains the central banks action in certain ways, will allow the nominal
exchange rate to depreciate in response to a negative demand shock.
Finally, in a low interest rate environment, the exchange rate channel can
play a key role in the management of aggregate demand. This paper nds
that the more open the economy is, the lower average ination it can achieve.
A policy implication is that trade liberalization, especially among emerging-
market economies, can improve the stabilization performance of monetary policy
regimes in these countries.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in the following manner. Section
2 sets up the model used for the analysis. Section 3 discusses the curse of
dimensionality when applying the collocation method to an open economy model
and presents a method to derive the optimal path of the nominal exchange
rate. Section 4 investigates the e¤ect of the zero lower bound on the optimal
target rate of ination and the stabilization performance of monetary policy.
Section 5 characterizes the optimal paths of the nominal exchange rate under
commitment policy and discretionary policy. In section 6, the importance of
the exchange rate channel in the low interest rate environment is examined.
Section 7 discusses some stylized facts to which the analysis in this paper may
be applicable. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model economy
The model extends the work of Svensson (2004), by introducing a staggered
price-setting strategy into the model of two economies, home and foreign. The
home country is assumed to have a continuum of identical home households h
(0  h  1  ) while the foreign country has a continuum of identical foreign
households h (1     h  1). Households in the home country consume
a basket of nal home goods and nal foreign (imported) goods. The same is
true for households in the foreign country, who consume a basket of nal foreign
goods and nal home (imported) goods.
Home and foreign nal goods are produced in two stages. In the second
stage, production of home and foreign nal goods occurs under perfect compe-
tition with a continuum of nontraded intermediate inputs of local di¤erentiated
intermediate goods. In the rst stage, a continuum of monopolistically com-
petitive home and foreign rms produce di¤erentiated intermediate goods.
In this section, I present a log-linearized version of the aggregate relation-
ships of the model. The basic setups of the model, including householdspref-
erences and constraints, the specication of the aggregate index of di¤erentiated
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intermediate goods, and the staggered price setting, are the same as a typical
open-economy DSGE model.
Throughout, zt denotes logZt   logZ where Zt is a variable and Z is its
steady state. ezt denotes logZt:4 Prices and quantities in the foreign country
are denoted with an asterisk Greek and Roman letters denote xed parameters.
2.1 Households
Home households supply labor to rms, save in one-period riskless bonds and
consume a basket of domestic goods and imported goods. Home households
choose consumption, savings and labor supply to maximize intertemporal utility
subject to a budget constraint. Solving the households optimization problem
yields standard rst-order conditions for consumption/savings and labor supply;
wt   pct = 'nt +
1

ct (1)
ct = Etct+1   (it   Etct+1   ) (2)
where wt is the nominal wage in period t; nt is the households supply of labor;
ct is the households consumption; it is the nominal interest rate; ' > 0 is the
elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor with respect to labor supply;  > 0
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption;  is the constant
rate of time preference; and Et denotes expectations conditional on information
available in period t: ct  pct   pct 1 is CPI-ination. pct is the CPI which is
given by
pct = (1  )pt + pft = pt +  t (3)
where  t  pft   pt is the term of trade; pft and pt denote the home-currency
prices of foreign and home goods, respectively. It follows that
ct = t +  ( t    t 1) (4)
2.2 Foreign households, international linkage and aggre-
gate demand determination
The foreign CPI fullls
pct = p

t + (1  )pht
Assume that prices are set in the currency of the producer and exchange-rate
pass-through is perfect, the Laws of One Price hold
4Except it which is the continuously compounded nominal interest rate and rt; which is
the natural interest rate.
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pft = p

t + st (5)
pht = pt   st (6)
where st is the (log) exchange rate.
Thus, we can write the (log-linearized) foreign CPI as
pct = p

t + (1  )(pt   st) = pt   (1  ) t (7)
It follows that purchasing power parity (PPP) holds,
pct = p
c
t + st (8)
Using (3) and (7) in (8),
pt = p

t + st    t
t = 

t + st   st 1    t +  t 1 (9)
Under the assumption of complete international nancial markets, the ex-
pected rate of nominal depreciation is related to the di¤erence between the home
and the foreign nominal interest rates according to an uncovered interest parity
it = i

t + Etst+1   st (10)
Finally, imposing market clearing in the world economy in which global
consumption of home goods equals production in the home country and global
consumption of nal foreign goods equals production in the foreign country, it
can be shown that
ct = yt    t (11)
ct = y

t + (1  ) t (12)
Under the assumption of complete international risk-sharing in which ct =
ct , together with (11) and (12), the (log) term of trade fullls
 t =
1

(yt   yt ) (13)
Combining (13) with (11) and (12) gives
ct = c

t = (1  )yt + yt (14)
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2.3 Production
The aggregate production function of home and foreign goods is given by
yt = nt + eat (15)
yt = n

t + eat (16)
where eat and eat denote the (log) exogenous productivity levels of the home and
foreign countries.
The real marginal cost for rms in the home country is then given by
fmct = wt   pt   eat (17)
Using (1), (3), (15), (11) and (13),
mct =

'+
(1  )

+



yt +



  


yt   (1 + ')at (18)
where mct is the log-deviation of the real marginal cost from the steady state
value, which is log  1 : at is the log-deviation of the home productivity level
from the steady-state level, which is normalized to 11+' log

 1 .
In the presence of nominal rigidity, rms set prices in a staggered fashion,
as in Calvo (1983), which implies that ination depends on the real marginal
cost according to:
t = Ett+1 +
(1  ) (1  )

mct (19)
In the absence of the nominal rigidity, on the other hand, rms adjust prices
in each period to the nominal marginal cost plus the gross markup
pt = log

  1 + wt   eat (20)
Dene home potential output as the hypothetical level of output, in the
exible price equilibrium for a given level of foreign output. Using (20) and
(18), potential output is then given by
yt = b1at   b2yt (21)
where
b1 =
e (1 + ')
1 + e' > 0
b2 =
e
1 + e'

1

  1


> 0
Productivity follows an AR(1) process
7
at+1 = aat + "
a
t (22)
where "at  i:i:d: N
 
0; 2"

:
The output gap, byt; is the deviation of (log) output yt from its potential
level yt
byt = yt   yt (23)
Foreign ination, foreign real marginal cost and foreign potential output can
be derived in the same manner.
Following Svensson (2004), in the case that the home country is interpreted
as a small, open economy, the foreign country can be treated as exogenous.
Without a loss of generality, all foreign variables are set to be constants.5
2.4 Monetary policy objective
I close the model by specifying how the central bank conducts its monetary pol-
icy. In particular, the central bank is mandated with the following intertemporal
loss function
Lt = Et
1X
j=0
(1  )j 1
2
h
(t+j   )2 + by2t+ji (24)
where  (0 <  < 1) denotes the constant subjective discount factor;   0 de-
notes the ination target and   0 the relative weight on output gap variability.
3 Optimal monetary policy under commitment
3.1 A straightforward way to derive the optimal path of
the nominal exchange rate
To derive the optimal path of the nominal exchange rate that is consistent with
the commitment equilibrium, minimize (24) subject to the model equations that
describe the behaviors of all variables. These model equations are (2), (4), (9),
(11), (13), (18), (19), (21), (22) and (23).
For the ease of presentation, write the above model equations in the following
state-space form
5Foreign variables can be assumed to follow some exogenous processes, such as AR(1).
However, this will not add further insights and will not change the main conclusions of the
paper. Assuming the foreign variables to follow AR(1), however, will add additional state
variables into the system. As will be discussed further in the next section, given that the
analysis in this paper is based on functional approximations, a system with too many state
variables can yield excessively large approximation errors.
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
Xt+1
HEtxt+1

= A

Xt
xt

+Bit +

C
0

"t+1 (25)
whereXt is a vector of predetermined variables, xt is a vector of non-predetermined
variables, it is the nominal interest rate, and "t is an n"-vector of exogenous
zero-mean iid shocks. In this particular case
Xt = (st 1; at;  t 1)
xt = (byt; t; mct; yt; ct ; yt;  t; st, ct) (26)
A; B; C; and H are the corresponding matrices of the model parameters. A
and B can be partitioned conformably with Xt and xt;
A 

A11 A12
A21 A22

; B 

B1
B2

Under the assumption that the central bank has access to a commitment
device, the central bank can adopt optimal policy under commitment.6 In this
case, the policy problem is
min
fXt; xt; it;gt0
E0
1X
t=0
(1  ) tLt (27)
subject to (25), the initial condition
X0 = X0 for a given X0 (28)
and a zero lower bound
it  0 (29)
This otherwise standard monetary policy problem is augmented by the zero
lower bound (29) which causes the model equations to be nonlinear. Thus, this
problem is no longer linear quadratic and certainty equivalence ceases to hold.
It can be shown that the rst-order conditions of problem (27), together with
the model equations (25), yield no closed-form solutions.
Nonetheless, problem (27) can be solved numerically using the collocation
method.7 To apply the collocation method, dene the dual period loss as
eLt  Lt + 0t ( A21Xt  A22xt  B2xt) + 10t 1Hxt (30)
where t 1 is a new predetermined variable in period t and t is introduced as
a new control. t 1 and t are related by the dynamic equation,
6See Svensson (2006) for a detailed description on optimal policy under commitment.
7Adam and Billi (2006) use the collocation method to solve a closed-economy model with
a zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. See Miranda and Fackler (2002) and Judd
(1998) for a detailed description on the collocation method.
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t = t (31)
Problem (27) can then be redened as the recursive saddlepoint problem
max
ftgt0
min
fxt;itgt0
E0
1X
t=0
(1  )teLt
subject to (31), (29), (28),  1 = 0; and
Xt+1 = A11Xt +A12xt +B1it + C"t+1 (32)
The value function for the recursive dual saddlepoint problem, starting in
any period t; satises the Bellman equation:
eV (Xt; t 1)  max
t
min
(xt;it)
n
(1  ) eL (Xt; t 1;xt; it; t) + Et eV (Xt+1; t)o
(33)
Hence under this setup, fXt; t 1g are state variables and fxt; it; tg are
controls:
3.2 The collocation method and the curse of dimension-
ality
The problem with solving (33) using the collocation method is that the system is
too large and we quickly run into the so-called curse of dimensionality : It should
be noted that since the problem (33) is no longer linear quadratic due to the
zero lower bound (29), the form of the value function eV (Xt; t 1) is unknown.
The collocation method solves the problem numerically by approximating the
value function eV (Xt; t 1) with a known linear function. In its approximation
process, the collocation method discretizes the state space into a set of nodes.
In this setup, we have 12 state variables. If we discretize the support of each
variable such that it can take on 5 values, or 5 nodes,8 the total number of
nodes in the discretized 12-dimensional state space will be 512: This is simply
too large for a personal computer to process.9
8This is the minimum number of nodes in which the approximation will yield a reasonably
accurate solution.
9A related problem for a large system like (26) is that a few algorithms of the collocation
method require inverting some matrices. It is possible that some equations in such a large
system may introduce singularity into those matrices.
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3.3 Solving a reduced-form model to avoid the curse of
dimensionality
To avoid the curse of dimensionality, we need to reduce the system into a man-
ageable size. Given that we have only two target variables in the loss function,
namely ination and the output gap, we can reduce the system, to be solved by
the collocation method, into a system of these two variables. Then, the optimal
path of the nominal exchange rate can be computed from the solution derived
from the collocation method.
In particular, using (21) and (18), one can show that the real marginal cost
is proportional to the output gap
mct =

'+
1e
 byt (34)
where
e = 
1  + 
Use (34) in (19), we then derive a standard Phillip curve
t = Ett+1 + byt (35)
where  =
 
'+ 1e  (1 )(1 ) :
Furthermore, from (14) and (4), it follows that we can write the Euler equa-
tion (2) as
(1  ) yt+yt = (1  ) yt+1j1+yt+1j1 
 
it   t+1jt   
 
 t+1j1    t
  
(36)
Using (13) gives
yt = yt+1j1   e  it   t+1jt   + e

  


yt+1j1   yt

(37)
Under the exprice equilibrium, we can write (37) as
yt = yt+1j1   e (rt   ) + e   

yt+1j1   yt

(38)
where rt is the natural interest rate, which is the real interest rate when prices
are exible, for a given level of foreign output. Given that productivity follows
the AR(1) process (22), the natural interest rate fullls
rt = (1  a)+ part 1 + "rt (39)
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Subtract (38) and (37), we obtain a standard aggregate demand relation:10
byt = byt+1j1   e  it   t+1jt   rt (40)
Hence, we can use (35), (39) and (40) to form a reduced form of model
equations (25). Under this setup
Xt = frtg
xt = fbyt, tg
and thereby we have three state variables, rt; 1t 1; 2t 1 where 1t 1 and
2t 1 are the Lagrange multipliers of (35) and (40). We then discretize the 3-
dimensional state space S into a set of N collocation nodes ª =fsn j n = 1; :::; Ng
where sn 2 S: The collocation method gives the optimal equilibrium of byt, t;
it for each node in the state space
fbyt (sn) ; t (sn) ; it (sn)g for each sn 2 S (41)
The optimal equilibrium value of the nominal exchange rate for each node
can be computed as
st (sn) =  t(sn) + pt(sn)  pt (42)
=  t(sn) + t(sn) + pt 1   pt
=
yt(sn)

  y

t

+ t(sn) + pt 1   pt
=
byt(sn)

+
yt(sn)

  y

t

+ t(sn) + pt 1   pt (43)
3.4 Discretionary policy
As a basis for comparison, I solve the model under discretion. In contrast to op-
timal policy under commitment, the central bank has no access to a commitment
technology and thus treats all future variables as given. More precisely, the
central bank under discretion solves the problem in (27) on a period-by-period
basis and taking into account the fact that the central bank cannot a¤ect fu-
ture variables. Such a problem has been solved in Adam and Billi (2007) on
a closed-economy model. I apply their algorithm to the small, open economy
model, as described earlier, to derive the equilibrium values of byt, t; i under
discretion. The equilibrium exchange rate then is derived from (43).
10Thus, the natural interest rate can be interpreted as a demand shock. In the base-case
analysis, the foreign output is set to be constant in order to facilitate the application of the
collocation method. Therefore, negative natural interest rates, or contractionary disturbances,
result primarily from negative productivity growth. In general, however, the natural interest
rate also depends on the growth of foreign output. Thus, negative natural interest rates may
result from any external factors that are related to recessions overseas.
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4 Optimal ination targets in the presence of
the zero lower bound
For the analysis in this paper, I calibrate the model parameters, rather than
estimating. The reason is that the data from the recent episodes of low interest
rate environments are not long enough to allow us to produce a statistically
reliable estimation. By relying on estimated parameters, it will be di¢ cult to
simulate a low interest rate scenario that resembles and that can be used to
analyze the recent real-world experiences that we are interested in.
I calibrate the model parameters such that the model can generate a low in-
terest rate environment, and occasionally contractionary disturbances can send
the economy into a liquidity trap.11 In particular, set  to 0.41 and  to 0.99
as in Laxton et al. (1998). Note that, as explained in Svensson (2004), when
 < ; the consumption channeldominates over the e¤ect of the home terms-
of-trade improvement from the increase in foreign output, which implies that
home potential output is decreasing in foreign output, or b2 > 0:
The elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor with respect to labor supply,
'; is assumed to be 3, which implies a labor supply elasticity of 13 . The elasticity
of substitution between intermediate goods  is 6, which implies a value of the
steady-state markup of 1.2. The Calvo parameter  is set equal to 0.75. The
constant subjective discount factor  is set to 0.99. Following Gali and Monacelli
(2004), I assume the productivity level to follow an AR(1) process, with the
coe¢ cient of 0.9.
Following Ball (1999) and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), ; the relative
weight on the output gap, is set to unity. Nonetheless, the main ndings in this
paper are robust to di¤erent values of , as shown in an extended working-paper
version of this paper.
It remains to be seen which target rate of ination that we should use.
Under the base-case calibration of the model parameters, I use (41) and (43)
to run stochastic simulations of the commitment equilibrium and I vary ; the
target rate of ination, by 25 basis points from 0 to 3 percent. Table 1 presents
macroeconomic outcomes under di¤erent ination targets. As evident from
the table, the ination target of 2 percent leads to the lowest loss, or the best
stabilization performance. Thus, I will use the ination target of 2 percent as
the base case.
It should be noted that if there were no lower bound, the optimal target of
ination would be zero. To see this, set  to zero. It can be solved from (35)
and (40) that in the optimal equilibrium, t =  = 0; xt = 0 and it = rt and
the central bank can stabilize both ination and the output gap simultaneously
and instantly. To conrm this conjecture, using the collocation method, I run
stochastic simulations as above but on a hypothetical model economy without
the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. Table 2 reports the con-
11A liquidity trap is dened as a situation in which the nominal interest rate is constrained
at the zero lower bound.
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Table 1: Macroeconomic outcomes under different target rates of inflation
Inflation target (%) Conditional loss Frequency of bind (%)
0.00 21.35 100.00
0.25 14.00 99.88
0.50 8.54 97.97
0.75 4.78 89.11
1.00 2.33 75.34
1.25 0.95 44.74
1.50 0.35 24.97
1.75 0.16 6.77
2.00 0.13 2.09
2.25 0.14 0.22
2.50 0.18 0.01
2.75 0.21 0.00
3.00 0.25 0.00
Note: These results are derived from stochastic simulations over 1,000 periods for 2,000 trials.  Conditional losses are
the average values of the intertemporal loss (24) over the 1000 periods.  The frequency of bind is the percentage of the
total number of periods in which the nominal interest rate is zero.
ditional losses for each target rate of ination under the hypothetical model
economy. It is clear from the table that in the absence of the zero lower bound,
the optimal target rate of ination is zero. Furthermore, at the ination target
of zero, the central bank can stabilize the economy completely with the loss of
zero, as predicted.
In reality, the zero lower bound exists and thus targeting ination at a very
low rate will be suboptimal. This is because the zero lower bound imposes
a constraint on the ability of the central bank to stabilize the economy. The
third column of table 1 reports the percentage of the total number of periods in
which the nominal interest rate is zero. It is evident that the lower the target
rate of ination, the more often the nominal interest rate hits the zero lower
bound. This is because at lower ination targets, nominal interest rates on
average are lower, generally close to the zero lower bound. This can also be
seen from gure 1 which compares the simulated paths of the nominal interest
rate under the ination targets of 1 percent and 3 percent.
Occasionally the central bank is required to create negative real interest rates
to o¤set contractionary disturbances. This however is di¢ cult to achieve in a
low interest rate environment since the nominal interest rate cannot go below
zero. Therefore, at a very low ination target, the central bank may not be
able to stabilize the economy at will.
At a very high ination target, on the other hand, the central bank will not
be able to e¤ectively stabilize the economy either. It should be clear from gure
1 that at a very high ination target, such as 3 percent, the zero lower bound
is no longer a constraint for monetary policy. However, the higher the target
rate of ination, the more di¢ cult for the central bank to stabilize the output
gap. To see this, iterate (35) forward
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Table 2: Macroeconomic outcomes in the absence of the zero lower bound
Inflation target (%) Conditional loss
0.00 0.0000
0.25 0.0018
0.50 0.0070
0.75 0.0158
1.00 0.0281
1.25 0.0439
1.50 0.0632
1.75 0.0860
2.00 0.1124
2.25 0.1422
2.50 0.1756
2.75 0.2124
3.00 0.2528
Note: These results are derived from stochastic simulations over 1,000 periods for 2,000 trials in a hypothetical model
economy that excludes the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.  Conditional losses are the average values of
the intertemporal loss (24) over the 1000 periods.
t = Et
1X
i=0
i (xt+i)
Thus, if the central bank attempts to achieve an ination rate other than
zero, it will not be able to close the output gap. This is a classic trade-o¤ be-
tween achieving zero average ination and macroeconomic stabilization in the
presence of the lower bound, as pointed out by Summers (1991). Under the
base-case calibration of the model parameters, it turns out that the ination tar-
get of 2 percent is the optimal target that best balances the adverse e¤ect from
the zero lower bound with the inability of the central bank to simultaneously
achieve zero average ination and close the output gap.
5 Optimal exchange rate policy in a low interest
rate environment
The left panel of gure 2 compares the policy functions of the nominal ex-
change rate under the discretionary equilibrium and under the commitment
equilibrium.12 Under the discretionary equilibrium, the central bank does not
12These are the equilibrium levels of the nominal exchange rate as a function of the natural
interest rate. The presence of the zero lower bound prohibits us from deriving a closed-form
solution of the policy function. Nonetheless, the collocation method yields solutions in the
form of the equilibrium value of the nominal exchange rate for each collocation node in the
discretized state space. Setting the two Lagrange multipliers to zero, we can then plot the
nominal exchange rate as a function of the natural interest rate. In the gure, I use a rened
grid, with 90 nodes between the natural interest rates of -4.5 to 4.5 percent. Notice that with
the presence of the zero lower bound, the policy function of the nominal exchange rate (and
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Figure 1: Simulated nominal interest rates
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1 58 115 172 229 286 343 400 457 514 571 628 685 742 799 856 913 970
Periods
N
om
in
al
 in
te
re
st
 ra
te
 (%
)
Note: The figure is derived from stochastic simulations over 1000 periods.  The lower path is simulated under the target
rate of 1 percent.  The upper path is under 3 percent.
seek to inuence private agentsexpectations, most likely because its credibility
is in doubt. Therefore, the central bank makes decisions on monetary-policy
making period-by-period. Under the commitment equilibrium, on the other
hand, the central bank can make a credible promise on its future action and
thus inuence private agentsexpectations. The ination target and thus the
average ination rate is set to 2 percent.
The solid line portrays the nominal exchange rate under the commitment
equilibrium. The dashed line is that under the discretionary equilibrium. As
evident from the gure, in response to a large positive demand shock such that
the natural interest rate is 1.2 percent or higher, the nominal exchange rate
appreciates regardless of whether the central bank can commit. However, when
the economy is hit by a negative demand shock such that the natural interest
rate is -3.5 percent or lower, the fact that whether or not the central bank
can commit yields di¤erent implications in terms of the nominal exchange rate.
That is, if the central bank follows discretionary policy, the nominal exchange
rate appreciates. On the other hand, under commitment policy, the nominal
exchange rate depreciates.
The reason that optimal policy under commitment and under discretion
leads to the di¤erent outcomes is because in response to a negative demand
shock, the central bank needs to cut nominal interest rates. Nonetheless, the
extent to which the central bank can ease is limited by the presence of the zero
lower bound on the nominal interest rate. This is evident from the right panel
of gure 2, which presents the equilibrium levels of the nominal interest rate as
the nominal interest rate) is nonlinear. As shown in Figure 3, when the zero lower bound is
excluded, the policy function is linear, as usually derived in a linear quadratic setup.
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Figure 2: The nominal exchange rate and the nominal interest rate in the com-
mitment and the discretionary equilibrium
Note: these are the policy functions of the nominal exchange rate and the nominal interest rate.  The two Lagrange
multipliers are set to zero.  The solid lines are those under the commitment equilibrium.  The dashed lines are those
under the discretionary equilibrium.
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a function of the natural interest rate. In the gure, the nominal interest rate
is constrained at the zero lower bound when the natural interest rate becomes
signicantly negative.
To conrm the conjecture that the zero lower bound on the nominal interest
rate is a source of the di¤erence between the movements in exchange rates under
the commitment equilibrium and those under the discretionary equilibrium, I
conduct the analysis on a hypothetical model economy that excludes the zero
lower bound. Figure 3 presents the equilibrium levels of the nominal exchange
rate and the nominal interest rate under this hypothetical scenario.
Without the constraint imposed by the zero lower bound, the equilibrium
level of the nominal exchange rate under commitment and that under discre-
tion become qualitatively similar. Particularly, in response to a large negative
demand shock, both commitment policy and discretionary policy prescribe a
nominal depreciation of the exchange rate. Thus, it is the zero lower bound
that is the source of the di¤erence in the exchange-rate movements between the
two policy regimes.
To understand the intuition behind this result, it should be noted that under
oating exchange rates, as it is the case in the model economy in this paper, the
central bank cannot control exchange rates directly. The central bank however
may inuence exchange rates via adjusting the nominal interest rate. Under
perfect capital mobility, the nominal exchange rate is related to the nominal
interest rate according to the uncovered interest parity:
st =  it + it + Etst+1 (44)
(44) implies that under discretionary policy in which the central bank takes
private agentsexpectations as given, the only way that the central bank can
17
Figure 3: The nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate in the ab-
sence of the zero lower bound
Note: These are the policy functions of the nominal exchange rate and the nominal interest rate in the absence of
the zero lower bound.  The two Lagrange multipliers are set to zero.  The solid lines are those under the commitment
equilibrium.  The dashed lines are those under the discretionary equilibrium.
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create a nominal depreciation is to lower the nominal interest rate. In response
to a decline in the natural interest rate, which is interpretable as a contractionary
disturbance, the central bank is required to cut the nominal interest rate. The
extent to which the nominal interest rate is to be lowered has to match the
decline in the natural interest rate. As evident from (40) and (35),
byt = byt+1j1   e  it   t+1jt   rt
t = Ett+1 + byt
this will allow the central bank to stabilize ination as well as the output gap
simultaneously and instantaneously. However, in the low interest rate environ-
ment, the scope that the nominal interest rate can be lowered will be limited
by the zero lower bound. In response to a large decline in the natural interest
rate, the central bank will not be able to cut the nominal interest rate by the
required amount. This is evident from the right panel of gure 2 which shows
that the nominal interest rate hits zero after the natural interest rate drops
below -2 percent. If the zero lower bound did not exist, the central bank would
be required to lower the nominal interest rate below zero, as highlighted in the
right panel of gure 3. This implies that, amid contractionary disturbances, the
nominal interest rate in the home country will be too high, which will induce
capital to ow into the home country and cause the nominal exchange rate to
appreciate.
Under commitment policy, however, the central bank can a¤ect the expected
exchange rate, Etst+1 in (44). Thus, even though the central bank cannot lower
interest rates su¢ ciently due to the constraint imposed by the zero lower bound,
18
the central bank can still cause the exchange rate to depreciate by creating an
expected depreciation of its currency. It follows from (44) that
Etst+1 = Et
1X
i=0
 
it+1+i   it+1+i

That is, the expected nominal exchange rate depends on the expected future
path of the gap between the foreign and the domestic nominal interest rates. For
a small open economy in which the foreign nominal interest rate is exogenous,
the nominal exchange rate then primarily depends on the expected future path
of the domestic nominal interest rate.
The right panel of gure 2 suggests that the nominal interest rate under the
commitment equilibrium is lower than that under the discretionary equilibrium
for every level of the natural interest rate. It is useful to interpret the right
panel of gure 2 as a scenario in which the economy is hit by a large negative
demand shock in period 0. This is the point at the left end of the panel. As
we move to the right of the panel, the natural interest rate continues to recover
over time until it reaches 4.5 percent.
Under this interpretation, the panel portrays the paths of the nominal inter-
est rate over time. In response to a large negative demand shock, commitment
policy requires the central bank to leave the nominal interest rate at the lower
bound longer than what would be prescribed under discretionary policy. Later
when the natural interest rate starts to rebound, and the nominal interest rate
is raised above the zero lower bound, the nominal interest rate under the com-
mitment equilibrium is still below that under the discretionary equilibrium.
Thus, one way to create an expected depreciation is for the central bank
to make a credible promise that monetary policy will remain loose going for-
ward even after the natural interest rate rebounds to a positive level. If the
central banks promise is credible, private agents will expect the exchange rate
to depreciate. This in turn allows the exchange rate, under the commitment
equilibrium, to depreciate today even though the scope that interest rates can
be lowered is limited by the zero lower bound.
The ability of the central bank to make a credible promise has a value.
Table 3 compares macroeconomic outcomes under commitment with those under
discretion. It is clear that commitment policy performs substantially better
than discretionary policy. The conditional loss, which measures the inability
of the central bank to stabilize ination and the output gap over the simulation
periods, is 0.1255 under commitment, compared to 0.6897 under discretion.
This suggests that in a low interest rate environment, it is indeed optimal for the
central bank to engineer a nominal depreciation in response to contractionary
disturbances.
6 The magic of foreign trade
As shown in the previous section, in the presence of the zero lower bound, the
central bank may not be able to adjust the nominal interest rate as aggres-
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Table 3: The stabilization performance of commitment and discretionary policy
Commitment Discretion
Loss 0.1255 0.6897
Note: These results are derived from stochastic simulations over 1,000 periods for 2,000 trials under the target inflation
of 2 percent.
sively as the central bank prefers otherwise. This is especially true in the low
interest rate environment in which the nominal interest rate will occasionally
be constrained at the zero lower bound. There is no such a constraint on the
movements of exchange rates, however. As highlighted in the left panel of g-
ure 2, the nominal interest rate is constrained at zero as soon as the natural
interest rate starts dropping below -0.5 percent. The nominal exchange rate
however can keep rising as the natural interest rate falls as far as to -4.5 percent.
Hence, exchange rates may potentially be a more e¤ective policy instrument in
this environment. But this requires that exchange rates can independently af-
fect the real economy. In other words, we need to examine the importance of
the exchange rate channel on the transmission mechanism.
As pointed out by many authors, one possible mechanism in which exchange
rates can have an independent e¤ect on the economy is through foreign trade.13
A nominal depreciation can cause the countrys exports to be more competi-
tive in the world markets. A rise in exports in turn can stimulate aggregate
demand. This implies that if exchange rates indeed play a role on the trans-
mission mechanism, we should expect a nominal depreciation to have a larger
e¤ect on relatively open economies in which exports account for a large fraction
of output.
In particular, commitment policy, as noted in the previous section, can im-
prove the stabilization performance over discretionary policy. The only dif-
ference between the two policy regimes is that in response to contractionary
disturbances, it is optimal to engineer a nominal depreciation under the com-
mitment equilibrium while under the discretionary equilibrium the exchange
rate appreciates. To examine whether it is this di¤erence in exchange-rate
movements that contributes to the superior performance of commitment policy,
consider varying ; which measures the economys openness, around its base-
case value of 0.4 from 0.1 to 0.9. Figure 4 plots the di¤erences in the losses
between commitment policy and discretionary policy for each value of :
When  = 0:9, which corresponds to the case that the economy is most open,
commitment policy can improve macroeconomic outcomes over discretionary
policy by the most. In other words, the exchange rate policy of creating a
nominal depreciation is at its best when exports account for the largest fraction
of the total output. Intuitively, it follows from (11) that
yt = ct +  t
yt = ct +  (p

t + st   pt)
13See for example, McKinnon (1999), Meltzer (1999) and McCallum (2000).
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Figure 4: The di¤erence in losses between discretionary policy and commitment
policy for di¤erent degrees of openness
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That is, in equilibrium, output equals aggregate demand and the second
term on the right is interpreted as net exports. To respond to a contractionary
disturbance, the central bank can usually lower interest rates to stimulate aggre-
gate demand. In a low interest rate environment, the scope of monetary-policy
easing however is limited by the zero lower bound. However, operating in a
small open economy, the central bank can resort to exchange rates as another
policy instrument. That is, given sticky prices, as in our model economy, a
nominal depreciation will lead to a real depreciation. This in turn can stim-
ulate aggregate demand through an expenditure switching e¤ect. Given that
ination depends on demand according to (40), ination can then be stabilized.
Generating a nominal depreciation thus allows the central bank to stabilize the
economy even though the nominal interest rate is no longer e¤ective.
The higher the degree of openness ; the more e¤ective the exchange rate
will be as a policy instrument. For an economy that is relatively open, exchange
rate policy will become more important. This can also be seen from Table 4,
which presents macroeconomic outcomes of an economy that is extremely open,
as characterized by  = 0:9: In this case, the optimal target rate of ination
becomes 1 percent. This is lower than the optimal target of 2 percent in the
base-case economy in which  = 0:4: That is, the more open the economy is, the
lower average ination the central bank can achieve. Given that the extremely
open economy with  = 0:9 can achieve lower average ination, it can also
achieve a better macroeconomic outcome with a loss of 0.05, compared to 0.13
under the base-case economy with  = 0:4: With a high degree of openness, the
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Table 4: Macroeconomic outcomes of an extremely open economy
Inflation target (%) Conditional loss Frequency of bind (%)
0.00 10.33 95.40
0.25 4.44 69.90
0.50 1.31 37.81
0.75 0.23 7.40
1.00 0.05 0.23
1.25 0.07 0
1.50 0.12 0
1.75 0.15 0
2.00 0.17 0
2.25 0.20 0
2.50 0.24 0
2.75 0.29 0
3.00 0.35 0
Note: These results are derived from stochastic simulations over 1,000 periods for 2,000 trials under α=0.9.
Conditional losses are the average values of the intertemporal loss (24) over the 1000 periods. The frequency of bind is
the percentage of the total number of periods in which the nominal interest rate is zero.
extremely open economy can stabilize both ination and the output gap more
e¤ectively because the exchange rate policy to create a nominal depreciation
becomes even more powerful in this case. Since net exports account for a
large fraction of output, a given nominal depreciation leads to a larger rise in
aggregate demand. This allows the central bank in such an economy to o¤set
contractionary disturbances more e¤ectively even though the nominal interest
rate becomes totally powerless as a policy instrument. A policy lesson here is
that trade liberalization, if increases the degree of openness, may lead to lower
average ination and thus better stabilization performance of monetary policy.
7 The era of low interest rates in the Far East
The most notorious episode of low interest rates has been the economic experi-
ence of Japan in which short-term nominal interest rates have been constrained
at zero from 2001 to 2006, with strings of recessions and deations since the
second half of the 1990s. Such a phenomenon in which the nominal interest
rate is constrained at zero and therefore the central bank may not be able to
stimulate the economy via the interest rate channel, is known as a liquidity trap.
However, from the end of 2005, deationary pressure seems to be subsiding
and the Bank of Japan raised the uncollateralized overnight call rate for 25
basis points in July 2006 and for another 25 basis points in February 2007 to
0.5 percent. Nonetheless, such a low interest rate still poses a challenge for
monetary policy, not on how to escape from deation, but on how to prevent
deation. For one thing, with low interest rates, future contractionary shocks
may easily send the economy back into a liquidity trap. This was precisely
what happened in Japan in late 2000 when the uncollateralized overnight call
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rate had stood at 0.25 percent since October 2000 but deteriorating economic
conditions and concern over deation forced the Bank of Japan to lower the
call rate to 0.15 percent and later to virtually zero after the Bank adopted
quantitative monetary easing in March 2001.14 Thus, it is still important to
study how central banks should conduct monetary policy in this low interest
rate environment.
More importantly, the phenomenon of low interest rates is by no means
unique to Japan. Figure 5 presents measures of short-term interest rates in four
Asian economies, namely China, South Korea, Taiwan (China), and Thailand.
Figure 5 shows that prior to the year 1999, the short-term interest rates in
all four Asian economies were relatively high on average about 10 percent in
China, South Korea and Thailand and about 7 percent in Taiwan (China).
Thereafter, the short-term interest rates in all four economies dropped sharply.
Their interest rates were at the lowest during 2002-2005, below two percent in
Taiwan (China) and Thailand and around three percent in the case of China
and South Korea. Although the short-term interest rates have risen in the past
two years, in line with the USs federal funds rate, they are all remain low by the
historical standard. Furthermore, the episode of extremely low interest rates,
as observed during 2002-2005, may very well reemerge in the future should these
economies are hit by contractionary disturbances.15
7.1 Attempts to generate currency depreciation in the Far
East
Interestingly, it appears that since 2000, the central banks in these Asian economies
have attempted to utilize exchange rate policy, with an aim to achieve the ex-
change rates that they desire. One common practice is o¢ cial intervention in
which central banks buy or sell foreign exchange to inuence exchange rates.
Taiwan (China) and South Korea stand out in this respect. Since 2000, it
appears that Taiwan (China) and South Korea have aggressively purchased US
14Under quantitative monetary easing, the Bank of Japans operating instrument was
changed from the uncollateralized overnight call rate to the outstanding balance of current
accounts held at the Bank, which together with notes and coins, constitute the monetary base.
Subsequently, the Bank aggressively raised the target level of the current account balance. As
a result, the monetary base rose for more than 60% between 2001-2004.
15 It should be noted that the constraint on the ability of these Asian central banks to
adjust short-term interest rates may be more severe than it seems. To be more precise,
central banks, especially those in emerging markets, are discouraged from lowering short-term
interest rates below certain levels due to some other considerations that are not captured in
the New Keynesian transmission mechanism. In this case, the relevant lower bound on the
nominal interest rate may be a small positive number above zero. For example, it appears
that emerging-market central banks are usually refrained from cutting their interest rates to
very low levels to avoid massive capital outows. Another, more specic, example, in March
2007, Dr. Atchana Waiquamdee, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, explained that
the Bank did not want to cut nominal interest rates further for fear that interest income
earned by households from their saving deposits would drop sharply. Given that interest
accounts for a signicant fraction of disposable income in Thailand, cutting nominal interest
rates to a very low level, even not zero, may lead to a sharp decline in consumption spending.
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Figure 5: Measures of short-term interest rates in four selected Asian economies
Source: Datastream.  The measure of short-term interest rates in China is 20-day relending rate.  Those of South Korea,
Taiwan (China) and Thailand are overnight call rate, overnight interbank swap rate, and 14-day repo rate, respectively
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dollars to counter upward pressure on their currencies. Table 5 compares inter-
national reserves accumulation in Taiwan (China) and South Korea with other
emerging market economies. At the end of 2006, Taiwan (China) and South
Korea had the largest international reserves as a percentage of GDP in the
world, at 65 percent and 23 percent respectively (Mohanty and Turner, 2006).
Alternatively, central banks may also intervene indirectly in foreign-exchange
markets. One way to do so is to impose capital controls, which are restrictions
on international transactions in nancial assets. A recent example, the Bank of
Thailand introduced a capital control measure, requiring nancial institutions to
deposit 30 percent of foreign-currency inows from non-residents in interest-free
accounts with the Bank. According to this measure, overseas investors would
have to leave such deposits in Thailand for one year, or face an early withdrawal
penalty (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007). The 30-percent deposit is in e¤ect
a withholding tax on capital inows, an attempt to create a depreciation of the
Thai currency.
Perhaps, the most e¤ective way to achieve a desired exchange rate is to
adopt a xed exchange rate regime. This is precisely what China has done.
Despite pressure from the US to allow the renminbi to oat freely, China instead
adopted a crawling peg after the country abolished the peg to the US dollar
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Table 5: International reserves accumulation in emerging markets
Change Stock
1990-93 1995-96 2000-5 July 2006
Asia 119 110 1,178 2,025
China 4 53 664 941
India 7 0 99 156
South Korea 5 8 136 225
Taiwan(China) 10 -4 147 260
Latin America 71 49 83 244
Central Europe 16 21 39 99
Russia 10 7 167 243
Middle East -3 8 50 89
Total 214 195 1,571 2,710
Source: Mohanty and Turner (2006)
in July 2005. Under the crawling peg, the renminbi has been permitted to
adjust not more than 0.13 percent a year. As a result, from July 2005 to the
end of 2006, the renminbi appreciated only 5.6 percent against the US dollar
(US Treasury Department, 2006). Adopting the crawling peg, as opposed to
allowing the renminbi to oat freely, essentially is an attempt for China to
prevent the renminbi from appreciating and thus to keep its currency at an
articially low level.
It should be noted that the inclination of these East Asian economies to
actively manage their currencies may be attributable to the legacy of these
countriess export-led growth policy during the East Asian Miracle era. In par-
ticular, all the countries mentioned above relied heavily on their export sectors
in achieving the extraordinary economic growth, that began in the 1960s for
the two tigereconomies of Taiwan (China) and South Korea, and later in the
1980s for China and Thailand. Even until now, exports as a share of GDP
for these countries remain remarkably high, as highlighted in Table 6. Given
the importance of their export sectors, these countries have a tendency to ma-
nipulate their exchange rates, to make sure that their export sectors remain
competitive in the world markets.
The question is whether it is desirable for the central banks in these countries
to pursue such policy. The analysis in this paper suggests that it is desirable,
especially in the low interest rate environment, to attempt to create a nominal
depreciation to o¤set contractionary disturbances. That is, given the limited
scope that nominal interest rates can be eased, the central banks should resort
to exchange rates as a policy tool to stimulate aggregate demand. This is
especially true for these Asian economies, which are relatively open, and thereby,
the exchange rate channel can play a large role on these countriestransmission
mechanism.
The analysis in this paper is also applicable to the case of Japan. As already
noted, despite having escaped from the liquidity trap in which the nominal
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Table 6: Exports as a percentage of GDP, 2005
Exports (% of GDP)
China 37
South Korea 42
Taiwan (China) 57
Thailand 74
Brazil 17
India 21
Mexico 30
Germany 40
United States 10
Source: World Development Indicators
interest rate was constrained at zero, Japan still has a very low interest rate.
In this low interest rate environment, the analysis in this paper suggests that
Japan should rely on exchange rate policy in managing aggregate demand. In
particular, it will be optimal for the country to create a nominal depreciation
in yen to counteract contractionary disturbances.
7.2 Implementing nominal depreciation by commitment-
based policy
Figure 6 shows the nominal exchange rates, from Jan 2002 to Jan 2007, of the
selected Asian economies that adopt oating exchange rates. The exchange rate
of yen per US dollar is also included for comparison. The nominal exchange
rates at the beginning of 2002 are normalized to 100.
During the period of 2002-2006, when the nominal interest rates in South
Korea, Taiwan (China) and Thailand were unusually low, these countries ag-
gressively intervened in foreign exchange markets to force their currencies to
depreciate. It should be noted however that, under oating exchange rates,
these countries cannot control their exchange rates directly. Thus, the mone-
tary authorities in these countries might not necessarily succeed in forcing their
exchange rates to depreciate.
Figure 6 conrms this conjecture. It is evident that the nominal exchange
rates have appreciated somewhat despite the fact that these Asian countries
have attempted a number of measures to keep their currencies weak.
Movements in exchange rates certainly can be a¤ected by several factors,
most of which are not captured in the model in this paper.16 The analysis in
this paper nonetheless o¤ers a plausible explanation. As noted earlier, in a
16 In the context of these Asian economies, the upward pressure on their currencies may
result from the expectations of an inevitable decline in the US dollar due to the US current
account decit. Another contributing factor is massive capital inows due to yen carry trades.
These are trading strategies in which investors borrow in yen, a low-yield currency, to invest
in higher-yield currencies.
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Figure 6: The nominal exchange rates of the selected Asian economies, 2002-
2007
Source: Datastream.  The nominal exchange rates are quoted in terms of the currency of interest per
US dollar.  The rates in Jan 2002 are normalized to 100.
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low interest rate environment, it is di¢ cult for the central bank to engineer a
nominal depreciation in response to contractionary disturbances, especially in
the case that the central bank follows discretionary policy. The reason is, in
this environment, the scope that the nominal interest rate can be cut is limited.
As such, if the economy is hit by a contractionary shock, the central bank will
not be able to engineer a drop in the real interest rate and thus will not be
able to rely on the conventional interest rate channel. The relatively high real
interest rate will induce capital to ow in. Knowing this, nancial markets will
expect the currency to appreciate and this makes it di¢ cult for the central bank
to engineer a nominal depreciation.
The analysis in this paper suggests that in order for the Asian central banks
to successfully create a nominal depreciation, they need to follow commitment
policy. That is, the central banks have to make a credible promise, that the
central banks will attempt to keep their currencies weak going forward even
after there will be no more contractionary disturbances. If the central banks
promise is perceived by nancial markets to be credible, the currencies will be
expected to remain weak. This will allow the central banks to create a nominal
depreciation even though there is little room for interest rates to be cut.
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8 Conclusions
This paper studies optimal exchange rate policy in a low interest rate envi-
ronment, a phenomenon that has become prevalent, especially in several Asian
economies and Japan after July 2006. The paper nds that in such an environ-
ment, it is optimal for the central bank of a small open economy to engineer a
nominal depreciation of its currency to o¤set contractionary disturbances. The
intuition is that in the low interest rate environment, the scope of monetary
policy easing is limited by the zero lower bound, which causes the nominal in-
terest rate to be ine¤ective as a policy tool. In this situation, the central bank
should resort to exchange rate policy. Given that prices are sticky, as in our
model, a nominal depreciation will cause exports to be more competitive in the
world markets. This in turn will boost aggregate demand and allow the central
bank to prevent the economy from falling into a deationary spiral.
However, as the recent experience of several Asian economies suggests, unless
the central bank adopts a xed exchange rate regime like China, it is not always
possible to achieve a nominal depreciation. Orphanides and Wieland (2000)
and Coenen and Wieland (2003), who also recommend that in the presence of
the zero lower bound, the central bank should rely on the exchange-rate channel,
suggest that the central bank can create a depreciation via a portfolio-balance
e¤ect. In particular, this can be done by expanding the monetary base on a
large scale. This paper, on the other hand, argues that in order to create a
depreciation successfully, the central bank also has to rely on the expectations
channel. That is, the present paper implies that aggressive monetary-base
expansion proposed by Orphanides and Wieland (2000) may be e¤ective, but
only if the central bank can make a credible promise to keep injecting liquidity
into the economy going forward even when the deationary pressure begins to
subside. According to the analysis in this paper, by expanding the monetary
base, but on a discretionary basis, and thereby only relying on the portfolio-
balance e¤ect, the central bank may not be able to generate a depreciation.
It should be noted that this paper focuses on exchange-rate policy under the
regime of oating exchange rates, which has become most prevalent among in-
dustrialized as well as emerging-market countries. This di¤ers from McCallum
(2002), who proposes using the exchange rate as the policy instrument when
the nominal interest rate is constrained at zero. In particular, McCallum rec-
ommends setting the exchange rate in response to ination and the output gap,
in the same way as a Taylor-type interest rate rule. By committing to a rule
with the exchange rate as the instrument, McCallums proposal requires that
the central bank can control its exchange rate directly and thus can achieve
any desired exchange rates in real time. One way to implement McCallums
proposal is to adopt a crawling peg whereby the exchange rate is adjusted in
every period to respond to ination and the output gap. The present paper,
on the other hand, examines scenarios in which countries operate under oat-
ing exchange rates. The policy recommendations in the present paper do not
require countries to make a switch to xed exchange rates.
Finally, all the papers mentioned focus on the scenario in which the nominal
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interest rate has been constrained at zero for some time. The policy objective
of the central bank is to escape from the liquidity trap at the earliest. This does
not necessarily correspond to the conventional central bank policy objective of
minimizing the volatility in ination and the output gap. In a nutshell, all the
paper mentioned attempted to apply their analysis to the economic experience
of Japan prior to 2006. This is appropriate given that these papers do not rely
on a fully dynamic framework with the standard conditions of uncertainty and
rational expectations.
The present paper, on the other hand, imposes the standard conditions of
uncertainty and rational expectations on a DSGE model and recognizing an
explicit lower bound on interest rates. This setup can be used to study, not
only the economic experience of Japan prior to 2006, but also the situation in
which interest rates are low but still positive and may fall to zero if the economy
is hit by su¢ ciently large contractionary shocks. Some particularly interesting
scenarios of this characteristic are those in several Asian economies and in Japan
after 2006. Thus, the present paper studies the conduct of monetary policy
under the standard policy objective of minimizing the volatility of ination and
the output gap, specically in circumstances where interest rates are unusually
low.
In subsequent research, I hope to consider several extensions to the work so
far:
First, the analysis in this paper is based on a calibrated model. The model
parameters are calibrated such that we can capture the episode of low interest
rates in the Far East, a phenomenon that has occurred only recently. When
more data become available, the model can instead be estimated by a more
sophisticated technique.
Second, after we develop algorithms that can be more e¤ective in dealing
with the curse of dimensionality, we can incorporate additional imperfections,
such as incomplete exchange rate pass-through or imperfect capital mobility,
into the model. This will allow us to study the interactions between these
imperfections and the e¤ectiveness of the exchange-rate channel.
Finally, under the commitment equilibrium, it is assumed that the central
bank can make a credible promise that will constrain its action in the future.
An important topic for future research is how to implement the commitment
equilibrium. In other words, how can we design a mechanism that induces the
central bank to deliver its own promise made from the past and thereby makes
its promise credible among private agents.
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